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There is good evidence that some ape behaviors can be transmitted socially and that
this can lead to group-speciﬁc traditions. However, many consider animal traditions,
including those in great apes, to be fundamentally different from human cultures, largely
because of lack of evidence for cumulative processes and normative conformity, but
perhaps also because current research on ape culture is usually restricted to behavioral
comparisons. Here, we propose to analyze ape culture not only at the surface behavioral
level but also at the underlying cognitive level. To this end, we integrate empirical ﬁndings
in apes with theoretical frameworks developed in developmental psychology regarding
the representation of tools and the development of metarepresentational abilities, to
characterize the differences between ape and human cultures at the cognitive level.
Current data are consistent with the notion of apes possessing mental representations
of tools that can be accessed through re-representations: apes may reorganize their
knowledge of tools in the form of categories or functional schemes. However, we ﬁnd
no evidence for metarepresentations of cultural knowledge: apes may not understand
that they or others hold beliefs about their cultures. The resulting Jourdain Hypothesis,
based on Molière’s character, argues that apes express their cultures without knowing
that they are cultural beings because of cognitive limitations in their ability to represent
knowledge, a determining feature of modern human cultures, allowing representing and
modifying the current norms of the group. Differences in metarepresentational processes
may thus explain fundamental differences between human and other animals’ cultures,
notably limitations in cumulative behavior and normative conformity. Future empirical work
should focus on how animals mentally represent their cultural knowledge to conclusively
determine the ways by which humans are unique in their cultural behavior.
Keywords: animal culture, comparative cognition, field experiments, cultural mind, metarepresentation
“Par ma foi! Il y a plus de quarante ans que je dis de la prose sans
que j’en susse rien, et je vous suis le plus obligé du monde de m’avoir
appris cela.” Mr Jourdain, Le Bourgeois-Gentilhomme, Acte II, scène
4, Molière (1670).
[“By my faith! For more than forty years I have been speaking prose
without knowing anything about it, and I am much obliged to you for
having taught me that.”Mr Jourdain, The Middle-class Gentleman,Act
II, scene 4, Molière (1670) The Gutenberg Project, translation by Philip
Dwight Jones].
APE AND HUMAN CULTURES: A DIFFERENCE IN
DEFINITIONS?
Over the last decades, numerous studies have provided evidence
for culture-like phenomena in wild animals, especially great apes.
Evidence is usually in terms of group-speciﬁc behavior patterns
(Whiten et al., 1999; Rendell and Whitehead, 2001; Perry et al.,
2003b; van Schaik et al., 2003), which sometimes involves neigh-
boring groups that live in nearly identical environments and are
genetically indistinguishable (Krützen et al., 2011; Gruber et al.,
2012a; Luncz et al., 2012). Furthermore, there is good evidence
that social learning is the primary force that explains differences
between communities in a number of species as opposed to genetic
or environmental factors (Jaeggi et al., 2010; Kendal et al., 2010;
Allen et al., 2013; Samuni et al., 2014). Building on a long tradi-
tion of experimental work in non-primate species (Warner, 1988;
Reader and Biro, 2010), a promising approach is to use experi-
mental techniques in the wild (Matsuzawa, 1994; Biro et al., 2003;
Gruber et al., 2009), such as seeding a novel behavior to investigate
whether it spreads throughout a community (van de Waal et al.,
2010).
Although much of this research is still on-going, many schol-
ars now assume that some animal behaviors are ‘cultural’ because
they are socially transmitted across generations, thus fulﬁlling the
widely accepted deﬁnition of animal traditions as “a distinctive
behavior pattern shared by two or more individuals in a social
unit, which persists over time and that new practitioners acquire
in part through socially aided learning” (Fragaszy and Perry, 2003,
p. xiii). This deﬁnition of traditions would be sufﬁcient to deﬁne
culture for most biologists, but culture can also be ﬁne-tuned as
“the possession of multiple traditions, spanning different domains
of behavior” (Whiten and van Schaik, 2007, p. 605). However,
two sources of skepticism remain. First, an equally inﬂuential
school of thought argues that ape ‘cultures’ result from convergent
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rather than homologous processes (Galef, 2009; Tomasello, 2009),
mainly because of differences in the underlying social learning
mechanisms found in humans and other great apes. As a result,
apesmay be incapable of producing cumulative cultural evolution.
Second, for some authors culture is more than a conglomerate of
socially acquired behaviors, and should therefore rather be deﬁned
as an integrated set of norms that its owners stand for and defend
(Hill, 2009; Perry, 2009). Whether or not these deﬁning aspects of
human culture are also present in animals is currently unknown,
which may explain why results from primatology so far have been
seen as largely irrelevant by many in the social sciences (Hill, 2009;
Perry, 2009).
In the following, we review what are currently considered the
two major differences between ape and human culture – cumu-
lative culture and normativity – and argue that differences in
metarepresentational processes, the cognitive ability to generate
representations of representations, underlie these ape-human dif-
ferences, offering a general explanatory framework. While we
acknowledge that it is possible to adopt lower-level explana-
tions to analyze animal behavior, including that of great apes
(Heyes, 1998; Shettleworth, 2010), we believe that there is com-
pelling evidence that human culture originates from primate
roots. Our goal in this article is to distinguish where exactly
human and great ape cultures differ to precisely identify what
evolved uniquely in the human lineage to generate modern human
cultures.
IMITATION, TEACHING AND CUMULATIVE CULTURE
The ﬁrst line of argument for a discrepancy between human and
animal culture concerns the nature of the underlying mechanisms
of social learning. Only human culture, it is argued, results from
imitation and teaching, while animal cultures are produced by
‘lower-level’ social learning, such as stimulus enhancement or
emulation (Tomasello, 1990, 2009; Galef, 1992, 2009; Zuberbüh-
ler et al., 1996; but see Whiten et al., 2009). This is supported
by the fact that there is generally no good evidence for teaching
in non-human primates, in stark contrast to the habitual natu-
ral pedagogy found across human societies (Csibra and Gergely,
2009; but see Thornton and Raihani, 2010 for evidence of teaching
in non-primate species). The role of imitation in animal culture,
however, is more complex. Although chimpanzees can imitate
(Whiten et al., 2007; Hobaiter and Byrne, 2010), it is not clear
whether imitation plays any role in the transmission of behav-
iors (Whiten et al., 2009) or in maintaining traditions in nature
(Claidière and Sperber, 2010).
Similar arguments have been made in relation to ‘cumula-
tive culture,’ which emerges from individuals’ abilities to ‘ratchet’
existing culturally transmitted achievements, that is to “. . .add
an existing technique used in a different context, or an entirely
novel technique, to an existing technique, and integrate them
functionally” (Pradhan et al., 2012, p. 181). Human culture is
profoundly more cumulative than anything ever documented in
animals, including apes. Composite tools, which are “made of
at least two different material elements that are kept together
so as to function as one tool” (Boesch, 2013, p. 31), are com-
pletely lacking in wild chimpanzees although they show evidence
for basic cumulative phenomena (Matsuzawa, 1991; Sanz and
Morgan, 2007; Boesch et al., 2009), as do captive chimpanzees
(Yamamoto et al., 2013), captive orang-utans (Lehner et al., 2011)
and New Caledonian crows (Hunt and Gray, 2003). In sum,
more work is needed to conﬁrm the cumulativeness of animal
behavior.
Some argue that humans have cumulative culture because only
we have both teaching and imitation (Galef, 2009; Hill, 2009;
Dean et al., 2014) but human-animal differences in social learn-
ing mechanisms may not be sufﬁcient to explain the emergence
of cumulative culture (Yamamoto et al., 2013). Many compo-
nents of human culture are causally opaque, that is, they cannot
be understood or developed by a naïve individual without spe-
ciﬁc instructions or explanations by a knowledgeable individual.
The development of a natural pedagogy to transmit this knowl-
edge may thus have acted as the main force of cumulativeness
(Csibra and Gergely, 2011; Pradhan et al., 2012). Animal cul-
tures, in contrast, are argued to be causally transparent and
to not require instructions to be acquired (Csibra and Gergely,
2011).
Cognitively, intentional teaching and especially pedagogy
appear demanding, in that multiple representations must be
stored,manipulated, and compared simultaneously (Gergely et al.,
2007). We therefore argue that higher levels of cumulative cul-
ture depend on representational abilities, to be examined in detail
below.
FROM INFORMATIVE TO NORMATIVE CONFORMITY
Amore recent line of argument for a qualitative difference between
ape and human culture is based on the notion of ‘conformity’
(Whiten et al., 2005; Claidière and Whiten, 2012; van de Waal
et al., 2013; van Leeuwen and Haun, 2013). The term was orig-
inally deﬁned as the alignment of one’s attitude with a majority
position (Asch, 1956; Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004), a ‘majority
inﬂuence’ (van Leeuwen and Haun, 2013). Recent studies sug-
gest that conformity-like phenomena may also exist in animals,
even to the point of forsaking a pre-existing individual prefer-
ence for the majority’s preference (Whiten et al., 2005; Hopper
et al., 2011; Claidière and Whiten, 2012; van de Waal et al., 2013).
However, the underlying cognitive mechanisms of these behav-
ioral effects are largely unknown, particularly whether animals
are simply biased to select the choice of the majority (informa-
tional conformity) or whether this is the result of social awareness
and a desire to conform to the group (normative conformity;
Deutsch andGerard,1955; Claidière andWhiten,2012; van Schaik,
2012).
Importantly, while both mechanisms occur in humans, there is
currently no good evidence for normative conformity in animals.
In humans, normative conformity is demonstrated if individuals
are less likely to choose the behavioral variant of the major-
ity in private than social contexts (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955),
a paradigm that to our knowledge has not yet been used with
non-human primates. An open question remains how important
majority inﬂuences really are in the transmission of animal behav-
ior, as most empirical studies have not quantiﬁed differences in
social transmission rates as a function of the number of avail-
able models (van Leeuwen and Haun, 2014), and whether there
really exists a disproportionate tendency to copy the majority
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in non-humans. Another good indicator for normative confor-
mity is the punishment of individuals who deviate from social
norms (Hill, 2009, p. 276). In the animal behavior literature,
the term ‘punishment’ usually refers to a retaliatory action that
leads to future compliance by the punished individuals (Clutton-
Brock and Parker, 1995). Certain processes are shared by both
informational and normative conformity (van Schaik, 2012),
with informational conformity forming the basis for normative
conformity. A graded integration of already present underlying
mechanisms, such as informational normativity, fairness-related
behaviors (Brosnan, 2013) or punishment, may have thus led to
normative conformity.
Similar to what has been argued for cumulative culture, graded
cognitive differences may explain the jump from informational
to normative conformity. Normativity requires some representa-
tion of norms and its more complex expressions therefore will
also depend on the extent to which representations can be stored,
manipulated and compared (Kaufmann and Clément, 2014). This
leads to the suggestion that, from a proximate mechanistic per-
spective, the ability to access the representational content of one’s
knowledge may represent the critical difference between humans
and other species. The analysis of the representational dimension
of culture requires a cognitive approach, which we will develop in
the next sections.
A COGNITIVE APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF CULTURE
Psychological studies of humans have repeatedly documented
how culture affects cognition (Mesquita and Frijda, 1992; Green-
ﬁeld, 1997; Kitayama et al., 2003; Sperber and Hirschfeld, 2004;
Nisbett and Miyamoto, 2005) in domains as diverse as spatial
cognition (e.g., Levinson, 1992; Levinson et al., 2002), behavioral
economics (Henrich et al., 2005), or time perception (Casasanto,
2008). For instance, children initially prefer geocentric (abso-
lute) strategies in spatial memory tasks but by age eight show
culturally dependent strategies, which is also reﬂected in their
spatial language (Haun et al., 2006). Additionally, the same study
showed that great apes also prefer geocentric strategies, suggest-
ing a shared evolutionary origin. However, despite such studies
and despite considerable interest in the cognitive underpinnings
of animal social behavior (Call and Santos, 2012), less work has
been conducted to understand how cognition and culture inter-
twine when it comes to representing knowledge in non-humans.
As a result, the human-animal gap remains wide, with animal
cultures characterized by group-speciﬁc catalogs of behaviors and
human cultures characterized by group-speciﬁc catalogs of norms
and their practices.
Nonetheless, one often quoted deﬁnition of culture in the ani-
mal culture debate is “the way we do things” (McGrew, 2004). This
requires an ability not only to mentally represent behaviors, but
also to identify the majority default behavior and compare this
with one’s own behavior. Humans are certainly endowed with the
ability to analyze their and others’ behavior, which enables them
to represent what they and others know and to deﬁne themselves
in terms of cultural groups. We can deﬁne this ability as ‘thinking
culturally’; but is there any indication for this in apes? Most animal
studies have not attempted to address the extent to which mental
representations affect cultural behavior.
One way to address the cognitive processes underlying animal
culture empirically is to present individuals belonging to differ-
ent cultural groups with a problem that can be solved in different
ways. If the problem is solved in line with pre-existing behavioral
preferences, then this can be interpreted as a signal for differences
in underlying mental representations. This interpretation is par-
ticularly compelling when individuals do not seem to comprehend
their environment in the same way, notably if one object (such as
a stick) appears to be understood as a tool in one given commu-
nity, but not in the other one. Possessing mental representations
deﬁnes the ability to think (Byrne, 1995); being able to access and
modify these representations is a crucial feature to copewith every-
day tasks. However, species may differ in their capacity to do so.
In a recent example, two groups of chimpanzees in Uganda, the
Sonso community of Budongo Forest and the Kanyawara com-
munity of Kibale Forest, were exposed to an identical problem,
honey trapped in a cavity of a large tree trunk (Figure 1, Gruber
et al., 2009). The two communities differ culturally, especially in
terms of whether or not they use sticks as foraging tools (Whiten
et al., 2001). Results showed that members of the two communi-
ties solved the problem with group-speciﬁc techniques consistent
with their cultural knowledge, that is, stick use in Kanyawara and
leaf-sponging in Sonso. Hence, the chimpanzees applied previ-
ously acquired tool use behavior to a novel foraging problem. A
particularly relevant point was that, although all Kanyawara chim-
panzees knew how to manufacture leaf-sponges, no one chose this
technique.
In a follow-up experiment, individuals were exposed to the
same problem, honey trapped in a cavity, but were also pro-
vided with a multi-functional tool, the ‘leafy-stick,’ which could
be transformed into at least three different tools: a sponge, stick,
or brush. Results showed that members of the two communities
found different parts of the tool salient and used them accordingly.
At Sonso, individuals detached the leaves from the provisioned
tool to manufacture a leaf-sponge, while at Kanyawara, the chim-
panzees used the stick part of the tool to dip for honey (Gruber
et al., 2011).
FIGURE 1 | A member of the Kanyawara community extracting honey
from the honey-trap apparatus during an experimental trial. (Kibale
National Park, Uganda, Courtesy of Andrew Bernard).
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Overall, these experiments suggest that chimpanzee behavior
is determined by previous experience, or knowledge, which can
differ between communities (Gruber et al., 2009). As a result,
different communities may differ in how they recognize and
use the affordances of an identical tool, suggesting that the way
chimpanzees perceive their environment is biased by cultural
knowledge (Gruber et al., 2011).
In a related study, rehabilitant orang-utans (wild-born ex-
captive individuals living in a sanctuary before reintroduction into
the wild) were exposed to the same honey-dipping task and to a
raking task. When individuals from two genetically distinct popu-
lations were tested they showed no difference in their performance
in the raking task, suggesting that their potential understanding
of sticks as tools was similar. In contrast, in the honey-dipping
task, their performance varied in line with whether or not stick
use was prevalent in their native populations, thus replicating the
ﬁndings in chimpanzees (Gruber et al., 2012b). Recently, the same
patterns have been reported from two populations of capuchin
monkeys (Sapajus apella): monkeys that were naturally unfamiliar
with manufacturing stick tools ignored and even discarded stick
tools that were provisioned to gain access to an experimentally
provided food source, while capuchins familiar with stick tool
manufacture used sticks to obtain the same food (Ottoni, per-
sonal communication). Overall, these results are consistent with
the view that, across primates and including humans, cultural
knowledge inﬂuences the way individuals perceive their environ-
ment and how they act on it, in line with the notion of ‘cultural
affordances,’ the “opportunities for perception and action offered
by the environment to an organism” (Kaufmann and Clément,
2007, p. 226).
In spite of these results, an important unresolved question still
is whether the mental representations underlying such variations
are akin to ‘cultural ideas’ (or cultural mental representations),
that is, mentally “stored form[s] derived from experience [. . .]
used to generate actions,” (Bryson, 2009, p. 83). Here, we deﬁne
a mental representation as an internal cognitive construction of the
mind that represents an aspect of the world. In doing so we follow
Leslie (1987, p. 414) who assumes that “. . .the basic evolutionary
and ecological point of internal representation must be to repre-
sent aspects of the world in an accurate, faithful and literal way,
in so far as this is possible for a given organism. Such a basic
capacity for representation can be called a capacity for primary
representations. Primary representation is thus deﬁned in terms
of its direct semantic relation with the world.” For instance, in
the context of tool use, the idea of ‘stick use’ could be deﬁned as
a mental representation that contains the object ‘stick’ and some
of its functional properties, which are deﬁned in terms of speciﬁc
actions. In other words, a learned association between a tool and a
reward can be represented as a unique mental representation (e.g.,
‘stick-to-get-honey,’ Figure 2A). This mental representation can
be cultural because it can be wildly shared within the members
of a given community, as the behavior it represents (Sperber,
1996).
Great apes are cognitive animals (Call and Tomasello, 2008),
in the sense that they can store their knowledge as primary rep-
resentations, but the key question is whether they also have more
complex representations, for instance, to represent and classify
an object (e.g., stick) as belonging to a broader class (e.g., tool;
Figure 2B), and not solely attached to a given reward as in the
‘stick-to-get-honey’ mental construction. In the following, we
apply conceptual tools of developmental psychology to analyze
the complexity of mental representations underlying great ape
cultural behavior.
MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS OF ARTIFACTS: A
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE
Developmental psychology has long been interested in how infants
come to understand their environment and the objects found
therein (Piaget, 1929), including artifacts (Margolis and Laurence,
2007). ‘Artifacts’ are a special class of objects because they have
been modiﬁed or created for a speciﬁc purpose, and are thus major
components of human material culture. Two-year-olds appear
to understand object kind and some artifactual properties (for
instance, they give an appropriate response to ‘a’ tool or ‘a’musical
instrument) but do not yet have an overall concept of tools (Man-
dler, 2007). Three-year-olds, however, start to understand that
artifacts belong tohigher-order units, characterizedby thepurpose
they are ‘made for’ (DiYanni and Kelemen, 2008). This important
cognitive and representational shift, which occurs between age
ﬁve and seven, is characterized by a transition from a vague to a
well-deﬁned understanding of an artifact’s function and typical or
intended use (Defeyter and German, 2003).
Empirically, this shift can be demonstrated by what has been
termed ‘functional ﬁxedness’: children experience difﬁculties in
solving a problem because of interference by previous knowledge.
For instance, children may fail to see a solution to a tool-use
problem if they are being offered a tool presented in a situa-
tion where it already has a well-deﬁned purpose but where the
situation requires a different use of this tool (Defeyter and Ger-
man, 2003). That children before age ﬁve do not show functional
ﬁxedness may be because they do not represent the intention-
ality of the maker, failing to understand that a tool has been
intentionally manufactured by a designer to fulﬁll a speciﬁc func-
tion, a phenomenon known as adopting a design stance (German
and Defeyter, 2000; Kelemen and Carey, 2007). However, other
interpretations of functional ﬁxedness exist and do not connect
it to the design stance. Individuals may simply fail to see multi-
ple uses of an object because previous experience has led them
to form an association between an object and a given function.
Hence, the function itself is not represented as ‘intended.’ This
interpretation has been argued for captive chimpanzees (Hanus
et al., 2011) and may explain why in the honey-trap experiments
discussed before, chimpanzees failed to use sticks, mainly because
this material is used daily to build nests, which may have pre-
vented them from considering sticks as tools to extract honey.
This interpretation obviously makes functional ﬁxedness a less
cognitively complex mechanism, but other wild chimpanzee com-
munities have overcome any ﬁxedness on nest-building by having
learned to incorporate sticks into their extractive tool repertoire.
This observation argues against the ‘simple’ functional ﬁxed-
ness hypothesis. This idea faces another problem when applied
to the honey-trap experiment. It is unable to explain how the
Sonso chimpanzees disregarded their only known function of leaf-
sponges (to absorb drinking water) in favor of extracting honey
Frontiers in Psychology | Comparative Psychology February 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 91 | 4
Gruber et al. The Jourdain hypothesis
FIGURE 2 | Comparison of a representational system where
individuals build independent representations (A) or can re-organize
their knowledge into categories (B) in the case of tool use. Full
arrows: act of mentally representing. Square: content of mental
representation, with or without embedded representations. Dashed
arrows: connections within or between mental representations.
(A) Independent Representations: individual NT forms a learned
association between distinct parts of the environment (for example, a
stick is associated with obtaining honey; a leaf-sponge is associated with
obtaining water). The resulting two mental representations are
independently stored in the individual’s mind. (B) Re-organization of
knowledge in categories: individual NT organizes individual representations
hierarchically, potentially under larger object kinds. For instance, ‘sponges’
and ‘sticks’ become members of the more general concept ‘tools’ in the
individual’s own representational system and can be used interchangeably
onto the different substrates ‘honey’ and ‘water.’ In the wild, chimpanzees
are known to use leaf-sponges to fetch water, a behavior present in all
studied communities. Additionally, in some communities, chimpanzees
have been observed to use sticks to access liquid, a behavior named
‘ﬂuid-dip’ (Whiten et al., 2001). (Photos of honey, stick, and river by
Thibaud Gruber; photos of chimpanzees and leaf-sponge, courtesy of Nina
Hänninen and Cat Hobaiter).
from experimental cavities (Gruber et al., 2011). This suggests that
leaf-sponges are not functionally ﬁxed to the purpose of extracting
water, although experiments presenting water and honey simulta-
neously are needed to support this hypothesis. It is unlikely that
the chimpanzees simply mistook the honey for water because it
was very obvious during the experiments that subjects were aware
that the resource was honey and not water, often visibly reacting to
the stickiness of honey by rubbing their hands on the logs. More-
over, no individuals at Kanyawara made a sponge to extract the
honey, despite leaf-sponging being customary in this community,
suggesting that the confusion hypothesis can be rejected. There-
fore, it is more plausible that the Sonso chimpanzees produced
leaf-sponges to extract honey by some form of analogical reason-
ing (Gillian et al., 1981), a cognitive process that requires access
to representational content (Gentner and Markman, 1997): they
may either have considered that all liquids should be treated the
same, or, reversely, that a leaf-sponge may be used on different
liquids.
In summary, functional ﬁxedness remains a possible explana-
tion for the patterns observed in wild and captive chimpanzees,
although it is difﬁcult to decide whether this is based on simple
or complex processes. Thus, it remains possible that chimpanzees
access their mental representations in a more active way, akin to
early reports of ‘insight’ (Köhler, 1925). At the very least, individu-
als must have activated a mental representation (e.g., leaf-sponge)
without the corresponding real world experience that generated
the representation in the ﬁrst place (waterhole). For example,
a chimpanzee may think of a leaf-sponge when ﬁnding a valu-
able resource in a cavity, without seeing an actual leaf-sponge –
it can start looking for the appropriate leaf material to man-
ufacture one as a consequence. Accessing knowledge, however,
may be cognitively more complex and may require that the sub-
ject also knows that it has the knowledge of leaf-sponges, which
requires the ability to generate representations of representations,
i.e., metarepresentations (Sperber, 2000b). In conclusion, while
‘simple’ functional ﬁxedness appears to act without actively access-
ing representations (that is, individuals do not need to be aware
of the content of their knowledge), ‘complex’ functional ﬁxedness,
as seen in older children, is based on representing intentions (a
design stance), a form of metarepresentation.
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To facilitate progress regarding the relation between chim-
panzee and human culture, we will next survey the different
levels of representation that may or may not underlie ape cultural
behavior. Our focus will be on processes that can be described as
‘metarepresentational’ in the context of culture.
METAREPRESENTATIONS AND CULTURE
The ability to attribute psychological states to others and to oneself,
or to have a‘theory of mind,’ has been identiﬁed as themost impor-
tant cognitive difference between humans and animals, including
great apes (Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Call and Tomasello,
2008). The classic test for investigating an individual’s theory of
mind is the ‘Sally–Anne’ test, a false-belief task. In its standard ver-
sion, the subject is presented with a performance during which an
agent (a doll) witnesses how an object is being placed in boxA, but
then is prevented from seeing how the object is moved to another
box B. As a result, the agent will have a false belief about where the
object is hidden, i.e., in box A rather than box B. Human infants
generally understand such tasks from age four (Doherty, 2008),
although more recent research has shown that precursor abilities
required to solve the task emerge as early as age two (Baillargeon
et al., 2010).
Having a theory of mind requires some form of metarepre-
sentational ability, the capacity to generate a representation of a
representation. There is an ongoing debate about what exactly
should qualify as a metarepresentation and different authors
have proposed different terminologies. One important distinction
has been to conceptualize metarepresentations either as ‘repre-
sentations of representations’ (sense 1; e.g., Leslie, 1987) or as
‘representations of representations as representations’ (sense 2;
e.g., Perner, 1991). In the latter case, the agent engaging in
metarepresentation must represent the fact that whatever is repre-
sented is itself a representation. The paradigmatic example is the
false-belief task,where the subjectmust understand that the agent’s
representationof theworld is‘only’a belief (object in boxA),which
differs from reality (object in box B). However, others have sug-
gested that the subject does not necessarily have to be aware of the
representational nature of the representation (Leslie, 1987). Perner
(1991) uses the term ‘secondary representation’ to refer to sense 1
metarepresentations, as opposed to sense 2 metarepresentations,
or ‘true’ metarepresentations.
Whiten (2000) has proposed a useful terminological distinction
between the two senses, keeping the name ‘metarepresentation’
for sense 2 and describing sense 1 as ‘re-representations.’ In doing
so, he uses a term introduced by Karmiloff-Smith (1992) as a
cognitive mechanism that allows accessing and sorting acquired
information: “...a way to gain knowledge is for the mind to
exploit internally the information that it has already stored (both
innate and acquired), by redescribing its representations or, more
precisely, by iteratively re-representing in different representa-
tional formats what its internal representations represent” (ibid.,
pp. 15–16). This individual-centered deﬁnition was subsequently
extended to social processes by Whiten (2000), who found evi-
dence that enculturated apes engage in ‘re-representation’ during
imitation and pretense. In sum, the term ‘re-representation’
(sense 1 metarepresentation, secondary representation) com-
monly describes a metarepresentation that does not require its
owner to be aware of the representational nature of its repre-
sentation, while the term ‘metarepresentation’ (sense 2 or true
metarepresentation) requires an awareness of the representational
nature (Table 1), a terminology that we also adopt in this paper.
Additionally, the wording ‘metarepresentational processes’ will
describe the general ability to go beyond simple representations,
that is to engage at least in sense 1, and possibly in sense 2
metarepresentations.
In the following section, we review the different metarepresen-
tational processes which appear central to the representation of
tools, and more generally to culture, and order them in a way that
could constitute an evolutionary pathway. Our goal is to identify
the different types of representations andmetarepresentations that
could underlie and sustain animal cultures1.
RE-REPRESENTATIONS TO FACILITATE CATEGORISATION AND
CONCEPTUALISATION
Group differences in tool use behavior importantly contributed
to the claim that chimpanzees have culture (Whiten et al., 1999).
Nevertheless, it is still unclear whether chimpanzees and other
tool-using primates resemble human infants (Träuble and Pauen,
2007) in having a true understanding of ‘kinds,’ such as tools, or
types of tools, such as hammers (Hauser and Santos, 2007; Hernik
and Csibra, 2009). Therefore, understanding how primates men-
tally represent tools is key for any comparison between human and
ape cultures. Humans are often considered unique in their ability
to represent objects as ‘made for something,’ that is, to naturally
adopt a teleological stance when dealing with them (Gergely and
Csibra, 2003; Ruiz and Santos, 2013), an ability that appears to
facilitate the acquisition of tool use behavior by toddlers (Hernik
and Csibra, 2009).
Not much theoretical work of this kind has been done in ani-
mals, despite the fact that great apes and capuchins are promising
species to investigate these questions. Jackendoff (1989) argued
that possessing a ‘true’ concept of something requires the ability to
verbalize it. By this criterion, primates clearly lack the concept of
‘tool,’ but Jackendoff’s (1989) criterion may be unnecessary. In all
likelihood, modern human language is a fairly recent evolutionary
invention that emerged well after humans had developed com-
plex and variable tools (Mithen, 1996). Thus, a conceptual system
of images, which may also be available to non-linguistic species,
may well have preceded a conceptual system of words (Gärdenfors,
2006).
An important question is whether animals can represent tools
at a conceptual level (that is representing tools as objects with
a given function to act on other objects) and not solely at a
1We argue that the ability to form metarepresentations enables an individual to
engage in self-analyzing processes (see Table 1), an ability also termed ‘metacog-
nition’ (Beran et al., 2012). In animals, metacognition is typically studied with
uncertainty tasks, in which a subject may opt for a lower-value reward when it
is unsure to obtain a large reward depending on how correctly it can assess its own
state of knowledge (Beran et al., 2012). There is a debate on whether there is a true
difference between metacognition and metarepresentation or whether the former
is part of the latter. For instance, Carruthers (2009) regards metacognition as min-
dreading applied to the self (Table 1). The main point of debate is whether or not
the content of metacognition is representational (Proust, 2007; Carruthers, 2009).
In our case, we have focussed on the representational nature of apes’ knowledge,
suggesting that metarepresentation is the more appropriate term.
Frontiers in Psychology | Comparative Psychology February 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 91 | 6
Gruber et al. The Jourdain hypothesis
Table 1 | Connection between Metarepresentation Sense 1 and Sense 2, the context, individually centered or socially oriented, in which they
occur; and the way they have been described in the literature.
Sense
Context Metarepresentation sense 1
Representation of representation
Metarepresentation sense 2
Representation of representation as a representation
Individually centered Re-representation (sensu Karmiloff-Smith,
1992)
Representation of one’s own beliefs as beliefs (sensu
Carruthers, 2009)
Socially oriented Ape-like theory of mind (Re-representation
sensu Whiten, 2000)
Full-blown theory of mind (sensu Perner, 1991)
perceptual level (that is representing a tool based on its physi-
cal properties, Mandler, 2000). For example, can a chimpanzee
categorize a leaf-sponge not only in terms of its perceived fea-
tures (wadge of folded leaves) but also in terms of its function or
purpose (liquid-absorption)? One possible way to investigate this
question is to study whether apes classify novel objects according
to functional (i.e., intended use) or perceptual similarities with
familiar objects, similar to earlier paradigms developed to study
analogical reasoning in chimpanzees (Gillian et al., 1981). Work
with cotton-top tamarins and rhesus monkeys has shown that
individuals can group objects into meaningful categories, such as
tools, foods, animals or landmarks, as well as recognize distinctive
features of tools (see Hauser and Santos, 2007 for a review). And
for New Caledonian crows, it has already been shown that individ-
uals can sort objects according to function, e.g., as sinking versus
ﬂoating devices (Taylor et al., 2011; Jelbert et al., 2014). Consid-
ering these results, it appears likely that tool-using primates such
as chimpanzees, orang-utans or capuchins represent their tools as
particular objects with a function to act on other parts of their
environment, that is, at the conceptual level, but experimental
work is needed to conﬁrm this hypothesis.
The main beneﬁt of re-representations is that they allow their
bearer to reorganize acquired information, for example by allo-
cating objects to categories, such as a leaf-wadge to a sponge tool.
Figure 2 illustrates this process in the context of tool use as a shift
from a simple to a complex representational format. In the simple
representational format, each tool is mentally represented as hav-
ing one purpose (e.g., ‘sponge-to-get-water’) with no connection
between representations. In the complex representational format,
simple representations also belong to more general categories, and
the items belonging to one category can be selected to function
on the items belonging to a different category [e.g., ‘use differ-
ent tools (stick, leaves) to access different foods (honey, water)’].
One relevant observation here is that in the Gruber et al. (2011)
study, the Sonso chimpanzees spontaneously used leaf-sponges to
extract honey, although this tool is widely used by wild chim-
panzees for no other purpose than to extract water from streams
or cavities (Whiten et al., 1999). One interpretation of this ﬁnd-
ing is that leaf-sponges are not exclusively and rigidly represented
in connection with water, suggesting that the Sonso chimpanzees
have employed re-representational abilities to ﬁnd this solution.
Nonetheless, because they appear to fail to consider sticks as poten-
tial tools in other experiments, their re-representational abilities
may only allow some ﬂexibility around already known artifacts
but may be too limited to generate the general concept of ‘tool.’
RE-REPRESENTATIONS AS REPRESENTATIONS OF TECHNIQUES
A second characteristic of re-representations is to allow an individ-
ual to maintain multiple mental representations simultaneously.
During imitation, for instance, an individual may hold represen-
tations of an action’s desired outcome and an effectively executed
motor pattern to achieve it (Whiten, 2000). Similarly, an indi-
vidual may be able to simultaneously maintain separate mental
models of two actions in order to compare them (Perner, 1991).
In the case of ape tool use, for example, re-representations may
allow an individual to generate representations of competing tech-
niques and compare them to solve a problem (e.g., representations
of leaf-sponging and stick-using to obtain honey; Figure 3A). A
recent study from the Sonso chimpanzee community is in line
with this interpretation. In November 2011, a few individuals dis-
covered a novel tool behavior, moss-sponging, to access water
from a natural clay hole (Hobaiter et al., 2014). Importantly, all
moss-using individuals were already skilled leaf-sponge makers,
suggesting that they possessed mental representations of two tech-
niques for one outcome, accessing clay water, or that theymodiﬁed
their existing mental representation of a leaf-sponge to add the
possibility of moss instead of leaves, in contrast to others who
did not develop the novel behavior. Whether or not individ-
uals also compared both representations cannot be decided by
this study. Interestingly, the two techniques differ in efﬁciency
(moss-sponges appear to hold water better than leaf-sponges),
suggesting that individuals should prefer moss-sponging, when-
ever moss is locally available. Primates are capable of assessing
the physical properties of their tools, in particular with respect
to size and weight of potential objects that can be used as tools
to complete a task (Matsuzawa, 1994; Fox et al., 1999; Visal-
berghi et al., 2009). However, there is also evidence for cultural
conservatism and individual habit formation in primates, which
may prevent them from changing techniques (Hrubesch et al.,
2009; Gruber et al., 2011; Brosnan and Hopper, 2014). More
ﬁeld experiments are needed to address how chimpanzees and
other animals evaluate the efﬁciency of their techniques. If chim-
panzees choose a solution that is more efﬁcient than a habitual
technique already present in their repertoire, a stronger associ-
ation between the novel tool and the original substrate may be
formed, leading ultimately to a change in the tool choice. How-
ever, this may require several trials to be achieved, which may not
always be granted in natural settings. The ability to compare men-
tal representations, allowed by re-representational abilities, may
allow switching to the novel technique directly after one individ-
ual trial or after witnessing others display this technique during
www.frontiersin.org February 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 91 | 7
Gruber et al. The Jourdain hypothesis
FIGURE 3 | Comparison of a representational system where individuals
can re-represent in parallel several actions in their mind (A); can
re-represent the identity of the individual attached to the
representation of the tool-using activity (B); and can fully
metarepresent that other individuals may have different beliefs than
themselves, applied to tool use (C). Full arrows: act of mentally
representing. Square: content of mental representation, with or without
embedded representations. Dashed arrows: connections within or between
mental representations. (A) Re-representations of techniques: individual NT
represents in parallel two different ways to achieve the same outcome:
‘obtaining honey.’ Re-representations allow individual NT to access and
compare both techniques, to select the most suitable one to achieve the
task. (B) Re-representation of techniques displayed by individuals: individual
NT represents in parallel that she is obtaining honey by using a
leaf-sponge, while individual NB is obtaining the same resource with a
different tool, a stick. (C) Metarepresentation of others’ cultural beliefs:
here, individual NT knows that she has certain beliefs, for instance that
honey should be gathered with a leaf-sponge; she also knows that other
individuals such as NB possess systems of beliefs – that is, individual NT
represents that individual NB represents that. . . – and also represents the
fact that the content of these beliefs may be similar or different from her
own. In the illustrated case, individual NB knows that the best way to
obtain honey is by using a stick, which differs from NT’s information, which
may result from individual or cultural learning. (Photos of honey, stick and
river by Thibaud Gruber; photos of chimpanzees and leaf-sponge, courtesy
of Nina Hänninen and Cat Hobaiter).
social learning, making it a much faster, potentially more adaptive,
process.
RE-REPRESENTATIONS AS REPRESENTATION OF INDIVIDUAL
DIFFERENCES
A more complex form of re-representation is for an individual
to understand that it is carrying out one technique while others
may carry out the same or a different technique, albeit toward
the same goal; or the individual may also represent itself per-
forming two different techniques. Here, the re-representation is
not only functional but also has a social dimension, by means of
comparing the self with others or between others. This mech-
anism may underlie the perception of intergroup differences,
if such observations are possible. In chimpanzees, this will be
rarely the case because of the species’ intense intergroup hostility
(Herbinger et al., 2009; Wilson et al., 2014) but this may be stud-
ied in dispersing adolescent female chimpanzees who adopt their
new community’s cultural practices (Luncz and Boesch, 2014). It
would also be interesting to investigate how bonobos, who tend
to be much more tolerant to the presence of strangers (Furuichi,
2011), would react to the sight of other communities displaying
different behaviors from themselves. One prediction thus is that
normative aspects of culture will only appear in species where
close intergroup interactions are common, a necessary precondi-
tion for the evolution of group-mindedness as a psychological trait
(Gruber and Zuberbühler, 2012; Tomasello et al., 2012). Equally
relevant are imitation tasks, in which chimpanzees of high social
status tend to be preferred as models for new techniques; how-
ever, this may also result from the fact that they are generally more
attended to (Horner et al., 2010; Kendal et al., 2014). In Hobaiter
et al.’s (2014) study, social learning was very effective for moss-
sponging, ﬁrst shown by the alpha male, but not very effective
for leaf-sponge re-use, ﬁrst shown by lower-ranking individuals.
Overall, these ﬁndings suggest that information on the identity of
the model is part of an individual’s representation of a technique
(Figure 3B).
RE-REPRESENTATIONS AS A BASIS FOR THE CUMULATIVENESS
ASPECT OF CULTURE
A ﬁnal characteristic of re-representations is that they allow repre-
senting tools, techniques, and the function of each component or
sequence of actions (Byrne and Russon, 1998) and their outcomes.
They therefore allow representing a tool independently from the
functional scheme in which it was originally deﬁned. The ability
to hold several representations in one’s mind at the same time and
compare themmayhelp an individual to associate different parallel
functional schemes with complementary outcomes, thus leading
to the creation of a novel scheme combining the two former ones.
For instance, to build a composite tool, it is necessary to represent
that both components can afford the same action, but also that
their association results in higher efﬁciency. The Acheulean hand-
ax, observed from about 1.7 million years ago, may have required
well developed re-representational processes to form the necessary
mental template (Mithen, 2007; McPherron, 2013).
The near-absence of cumulative culture in apes, may therefore
be due to their limited re-representational abilities, allowing some
ﬂexibility around behaviors that are already present in the reper-
toire (for instance to invent a moss-sponge based on a known
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leaf-sponge) but making qualitative jumps very unlikely. In con-
trast, belief-based metarepresentations do not seem crucial to
analyze the functional schemes present in one’s current knowl-
edge and to seek how to improve them. Re-representations may
also sustain other complex cognitive processes recently proposed
to be involved in the cumulativeness of human culture such as
mental time travel (Fogarty et al., 2012; Vale et al., 2012). There
is evidence for mental time travel coming from a range of other
animals than humans, including great apes and corvids (e.g., van
Schaik et al., 2013), although alternative explanations have been
proposed (Fogarty et al., 2012; Vale et al., 2012). This suggests that
some re-representational abilities are present in these species but
that their extent is limited. In sum, more work is needed to pre-
cisely understand the scope of re-representations and their use in
animals.
METAREPRESENTATIONS TO REPRESENT OTHERS’ CULTURAL
KNOWLEDGE
The highest stage of metarepresentational process, in our con-
text, is to appreciate that members of another group may harbor
beliefs that are different from one’s own group, that is, to
compare ‘how things ought to be’ (Figure 3C). Here, cogni-
tion goes beyond simple re-representations, which could sustain
all previous aspects of cultural knowledge, i.e., categorisation,
representation of techniques, and representation of models. In
effect, the metarepresentational processes must become ‘represen-
tations of representations as representations’ (sensu Perner, 1991,
see Table 1), that is metarepresentations. In humans, this type
of metarepresentation probably underlies complex mental state
attribution, intentional teaching and belief-based imitation, the
human ‘theory of mind’ (Tomasello et al., 2005 and comments;
Meltzoff, 2007). The ability to mentally represent and compare
own and others’ knowledge may reﬁne the categorisation of part-
ners as ‘same’ or ‘other.’ Such reasoning, if associated with feelings
of group identity, appears to be an ingredient for the emergence
of social norms. Humans have an urge to conform to the behav-
ior of others, but to perceive group behavior as normative and
recognize deviation, it is also necessary to mentally represent the
group norm, ‘the way things ought to be.’Humans tend to become
aggressive toward non-followers, while positive reinforcement also
plays a role, for instance, in the case of the ‘chameleon effect,’ when
individuals engaged in an interaction unintentionally match each
other’s behaviors (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999). How this effect
connects to norms, however, remains to our knowledge to be
investigated.
The theory of mind of great apes, in contrast, appears to be
more limited and unable to take into account others’ false beliefs,
suggesting that their metarepresentational abilities are equally
limited (Call and Tomasello, 2008). Chimpanzees have access to
others’ perceptual knowledge (Hare et al., 2000, 2001), but appear
to have great difﬁculties accessing others’ beliefs, especially if they
deviate from their own (Kaminski et al., 2008; Krachun et al.,
2010). However, a research program studying how apes assess their
own and others’ cultural knowledge has yet to be implemented.
This research may also beneﬁt other areas of metarepresenta-
tion. Controlled learning experiments (e.g., Marshall-Pescini and
Whiten, 2008) will help to determine whether knowledgeable
chimpanzees adjust their behavior to the state of knowledge of
their naïve observers. During teaching, representing both the cur-
rent state of knowledge of naïve individuals at the time of learning
and the desired state of knowledge they must reach before being
considered knowledgeable (e.g., they have acquired a set of rules or
a technique) is crucial for knowledge transmission. In this respect,
the ability to evaluate the state of knowledge of naïve observers,
relying on metarepresentations, has most probably contributed
to develop the full-ﬂedge pedagogy now displayed by modern
humans (Csibra and Gergely, 2009, 2011). While this remains
to be tested, it is therefore unlikely that a chimpanzee would be
shocked when it sees another behaving differently from the group
norm, which would require the individual to understand that oth-
ers may have values that deviate from its own and, by extension, to
have a profound understanding of its own culture. Apes, in other
words, are unlikely to consider whether ‘this is the right way to do
it,’ a crucial feature of the human cultural mind and normative
culture.
In sum, metarepresentations allow individuals to represent
both one’s own cultural beliefs and those of others (Sperber,
2000a). Currently, we do not know whether this ability is present
in apes and thus whether ape and human cultures differ in this
important domain (see Table 2). As of now, the empirical data are
consistent withwhatwe call the ‘JourdainHypothesis,’which states
that apes have culture, but do not know that they do, in analogy
to Molière’s Monsieur Jourdain, who had been speaking prose for
40 yearswithout realizing it. By analogy, chimpanzeesmaypractice
their culture without knowing that they do, and future research
must assess whether they can represent their own and others’ cul-
tural behaviors as cultural norms. In the previous sections, we
have shown that the ability to represent one’s own knowledge and
others’ knowledge and the different ways of doing so appear fun-
damental to the human form of culture (e.g., Henrich et al., 2010).
It thus appears necessary to determine whether a ‘Jourdain-like
culture,’ that is, a culture its holder does not represent, can qualify
as ‘culture,’ in particular with respect to other hominoids and to
our earliest hominin ancestors, whose mental abilities may have
been similar to those of great apes (Mithen, 1996).
SUMMARY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The notion of metarepresentation has become widely used in
false-belief research, while other metarepresentational processes
have been neglected (Sperber, 2000b). Similarly, in the animal
culture discussion, the latter have only played a role under the
rubric of mindreading in comparing social learning processes that
can lead to behavioral traditions, namely imitation and teach-
ing (Tomasello et al., 2005 and comments). In this article, we
have argued that metarepresentational processes may be useful
to explain a wider range of features of human and animal cul-
tures, from representing objects as culture-speciﬁc, meaningful
artifacts to understanding that another individual may or may
not share a cultural belief. For animals, it is conceivable that
social learning acting on innovations driven by the environment
is sufﬁcient to generate the full range of behavioral traditions
currently documented, but several recent studies question this
hypothesis (van de Waal et al., 2013; Luncz and Boesch, 2014).
In humans, however, culture is a co-construction of minds, and
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Table 2 | Summary of the different stages of representations involved in the cultural process and their presence in humans and great apes,
according to current knowledge.
Representational stage
Species Humans (e.g.,
Sperber, 1996)
Non-human great apes
Primary (simple) mental representation Present Present (e.g., spatial memory, see Janmaat et al., 2013).
Re-representations
– Categorisation Present Present at the perceptual level but experiments needed to explore the
conceptual level (Hauser and Santos, 2007; Ruiz and Santos, 2013).
– Representation of techniques Present Potentially present (Whiten, 2000; Hobaiter et al., 2014) but experiments
needed to conﬁrm their extent.
– Representation of practitioners Present Understanding of different models (Hopper et al., 2011) group identity
present but no group-mindedness (Gruber and Zuberbühler, 2012;
Tomasello et al., 2012).
Metarepresentation of cultural beliefs Present Absent (Call andTomasello, 2008).
this may require considerable ﬂexibility in how knowledge is
organized. Therefore, culture without metarepresentational pro-
cesses may never go beyond simple collections of behavioral
traditions, acquired through social learning, usually conﬁned
within small social units (e.g., Hirata et al., 2001; Muller and
Cant, 2010), and rarely spreading into group-speciﬁc patterns.
In contrast, culture with simple metarepresentational processes
(re-representation) may be present in great apes, and this may
have served as the evolutionary origins of another type of cul-
ture: a pattern of ideas that have normative force. Finally, culture
with complex metarepresentation characterizes human culture,
which is based on belief psychology, shared knowledge, values,
and norms.
In this article, we focussed largely on chimpanzee tool use to
illustrate how to analyze the cognitive aspects underlying animal
culture, particularly the role of mental representations. We believe
that our framework has a generic value and can be applied to all
species with behavioral traditions, granted that they have the nec-
essary brain structures for higher cognition, such as a neocortex
(mammals) or equivalent structures in other species (for instance,
the dorsal ventricular ridge in birds, Dugas-Ford et al., 2012), fol-
lowing Gärdenfors (2006). Although much of animal culture is
material, there is evidence that a number of social behaviors also
qualify as cultural (e.g.,Whiten et al., 1999; Perry et al., 2003a; van
Schaik et al., 2003), suggesting they make equally interesting can-
didates to study the role of representations, re-representations and
metarepresentations.
In conclusion, to properly compare animal and human cul-
tures it is necessary to identify the metarepresentational processes
that underlie behavior. We have identiﬁed two types of metarep-
resentational processes. The ﬁrst one is self-oriented, allowing
an individual to access its own knowledge (‘re-representation’).
The second one is based on mental state attributions, allowing an
individual to have access to more efﬁcient transmission of knowl-
edge (‘metarepresentation’). How the two co-evolved will need
consideration, notably as primate cognition evolved within stable
social groups (Byrne and Whiten, 1988). Great apes are the only
available model to assess the evolutionary transition in behavior
and cognitive abilities from early hominins to modern humans
(McPherron, 2013). It seems safe to assume that early hominins
possessed material cultures at least as complex as described for
modern great apes (van Schaik et al., 2003), but at what stage they
also became aware of their own culture as one possible variant is
impossible to decide. Progress can be made by targeted research
on great apes and other animals, concerning their relationships
with artifacts. A key test is whether an animal would be surprised
if another group member deviated from an established technique
to solve a familiar task. Current progress in infant and child cog-
nition research offers promising new avenues, notably in adapting
studies of object categorisation, representation, and conceptual-
isation (Kelemen and Carey, 2007; Mandler, 2007; DiYanni and
Kelemen, 2008; Ruiz and Santos, 2013). For instance, research on
functional ﬁxedness will provide a deeper understanding of the
cognitive underlay of primate culture. Here, the key prediction is
that chimpanzees raised in captivity (with no experience in nest
building) should solve the honey-trap experimentmore easily than
wild chimpanzees with no stick use tradition (such as the Sonso
community).
It is possible that great apes have more advanced metarepre-
sentational capacities than generally thought (Call and Tomasello,
2008), although they seem to be better described as re-
representations (sensu Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). Building on pre-
vious work, we argued that apes may be able to search through
their own cultural knowledge to select the most adequate tool
for a given task, as described in Figures 2B and 3A, but
more research is needed to test this hypothesis. In particular,
experiments are required in which apes need to maintain sev-
eral representations simultaneously to succeed. While they are
probably able to associate particular individuals with particular
techniques (Figure 3B), it seems less likely that they can asso-
ciate a given behavior with a group of individuals, a necessary
condition to understanding culture as a shared property of minds.
Again, speciﬁc experimentswill be required to address this hypoth-
esis. Finally, we ﬁnd it implausible that apes are able to attribute
cultural beliefs to members of their groups (Figure 3C), which
would require complex metarepresentational abilities. Once the
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necessary studies have been conducted, it should be possible to
draw more certain conclusions about the nature of the mental
representations underlying animal culture, which is ultimately
necessary to understand the evolution of the human cultural
mind.
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